

Message Text

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DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR A AND EUR/RPM; LONDON ALSO FOR
A/COUNS AND WHITE HOUSE ADVANCE

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, NATO, NAC
SUBJECT: NATO SUMMIT AGENDA: LUNS' POLITICAL APPRAISAL

REF: (A) USNATO 2467, (B) USNATO 2483

THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF SYG LUNS' "ANNUAL POLITICAL
APPRAISAL, 1977" (C-M(77)37), WHICH WILL BE MENTIONED
AS A REFERENCE DOCUMENT UNDER ITEM I OF THE NATO SUMMIT
AGENDA.

BEGIN TEXT:
ANNUAL POLITICAL APPRAISAL, 1977
REPORT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE OF
THREE (THE WISE MEN'S REPORT) OF 1956, I AM SETTING FORTH
IN THIS PAPER MY PERSONAL VIEWS ON SOME OF THE MAJOR POLI-
TICAL PROBLEMS NOW FACING THE ALLIANCE. THIS ASSESSMENT IS
MADE ENTIRELY ON MY OWN RESPONSIBILITY, IN ORDER TO PRE-
PARE THE GROUND FOR THE FORTHCOMING MINISTERIAL MEETING,
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AND THUS TO ASSIST THE PARTICIPANTS IN THAT MEETING TO
REACH A COMMON APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL ENVIRON-
MENT. THE PARTICIPATION IN THE LONDON MEETING OF ALMOST
ALL HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WILL PROVIDE AN EXCELLENT OPPOR-
TUNITY FOR A FUNDAMENTAL EXAMINATION OF SOME OF OUR PRESENT
CONCERNS, WHICH FALL INTO TWO MAJOR SECTORS, THE STATE OF
THE ALLIANCE AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

I. THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE

2. THE ALLIANCE, WHICH HAS NOW BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR 28 YEARS, HAS SURVIVED MANY TESTS OVER THAT PERIOD. ONE PROTRACTED CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ALLIANCE MEMBERS HAS BEEN TERMINATED, DUE IN LARGE PART TO THE POLITICAL WISDOM AND COURAGE OF THE LATE LAMENTED ANTHONY CROSLAND.

3. HOWEVER, THE BITTER DISPUTE BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY CONTINUES TO CLOUD THE OUTLOOK FOR THE SECURITY OF ALL THE ALLIES ON THE IMPORTANT SOUTH EASTERN FLANK OF THE ALLIANCE. THE TALKS BETWEEN THE PARTIES IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED, WHILE USEFUL AS FIRST STEPS ALONG THE WAY TO AN EVENTUAL ACCOMMODATION, HAVE REFLECTED WIDE AND PERSISTENT DIVERGENCIES OF VIEW BETWEEN THEM. BECAUSE OF THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES, IT HAS NOT EVEN BEEN POSSIBLE FOR ME TO RESTORE MY OWN ROLE UNDER THE WATCHING BRIEF ENTRUSTED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN 1964. MUCH STILL REMAINS TO BE DONE IN THE DIRECTION OF RESOLVING THE CONTINUING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR VALUED ALLIES ON A WIDE VARIETY OF DELICATE AND IMPORTANT ISSUES. I URGE EVERYONE WHO CAN INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION TO MAKE A RENEWED EFFORT TO REACH A PROMPT AND EQUITABLE SOLUTION.

4. ALL OUR MEMBERS ARE NOW LED BY DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENTS, WHICH SERVES FURTHER TO HIGHLIGHT THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE PLURALISM AND OPENNESS OF WESTERN SOCIETY AND THE CLOSED, TOTALITARIAN SOCIETIES IN EASTERN EUROPE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE VERY OPENNESS OF DEMOCRATICALLY ORGANIZED WESTERN SOCIETIES TENDS TO DRAMATIZE OUR ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS, MANY OF WHICH

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MANIFEST THEMSELVES AS DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES AND ARE THEREFORE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR RESOLUTION VIA ALLIANCE CHANNELS. THERE IS NO DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT SIMILAR THREADS RUN THROUGH MOST OF THESE NATIONAL PROBLEMS. A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF SUCH ISSUES IS THEREFORE VERY USEFUL.

5. THE SEVERE ECONOMIC STRAIN COMMON TO MANY MEMBER COUNTRIES APPEARS TO BE THE PRIME STIMULUS FOR MUCH OF THE TURBULENCE WE SEE TODAY. HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT THE ONLY STIMULUS, BECAUSE THE PUBLIC'S REACTION TO WHAT SOME SEE AS AIMLESS DRIFT, RATHER THAN VIGOROUS AND FAR-SIGHTED LEADERSHIP, IS AMONG THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSES OF THE PRESENT MALAISE.

6. THERE ARE POLITICAL CROSS-CURRENTS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, AND SOMETIMES WITHIN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES, BUT I SEE A TREND TOWARDS INCREASED RADICALIZATION, PRIMARILY ON THE LEFT BUT AFFECTING THE RIGHT AS WELL. OUR ALLIANCE MUST BE AWARE OF SUCH SENTIMENTS, WHICH PROVIDE A FERTILE GROUND FOR POLITICAL EXTREMISM AND EVEN TERRORISM. UNCHECKED, SUCH TENDENCIES COULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE

THE BASIS FOR OUR SECURITY BY ERODING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
IN THE ABILITY OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIES TO DISCHARGE
THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES EFFECTIVELY.

POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS

7. ONE OF THE BEST MEANS OF UNDERLINING ALLIANCE SOLIDAR-
ITY, AT LONDON AND SUBSEQUENTLY, IS TO REALIZE MORE
FULLY THE POTENTIAL STRENGTH OF DEEPENED CONSULTATIONS
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. AS THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
THREE COGENTLY POINTED OUT, IT IS EASY TO PROFESS DEVOTION
TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSULTATION IN NATO, BUT

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VERY DIFFICULT TO CONVERT THE PROVESSION INTO PRACTICE.
THE COMMITTEE ALSO STRESSED THAT CONSULTATION MEANS MORE
THAN LETTING THE COUNCIL KNOW ABOUT NATIONAL DECISIONS
THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN TAKEN. IT MEANS, RATHER, THE DIS-
CUSSION OF PROBLEMS COLLECTIVELY BEFORE NATIONAL POSITIONS
BECOME FIXED.

8. IN FACT, THE SITUATION IS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT
WAS WHEN THE THREE WISE MEN ADDRESSED THE PROBLEM SOME
20 YEARS AGO. ALTHOUGH THEY NOTED THAT CONSULTATIONS MEANT
MORE THAN JUST LETTING THE COUNCIL KNOW ABOUT NATION-
AL DECISIONS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN TAKEN, THEY WERE UNABLE
TO FORESEE THE EXTENT TO WHICH INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS
MIGHT BE TAKEN BEFORE REAL CONSULTATIONS IN THE ALLIANCE
HAD BEEN HELD. MOST MEMBERS OF OUR ALLIANCE NOW BELONG
TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEY FIND IT
SOMETIMES DIFFICULT TO GIVE NATO CONSULTATIONS THE

ATTENTION WHICH I BELIEVE THEY MUST HAVE IF THE ESSENTIAL INTERESTS OF ALL ITS MEMBERS ARE NOT TO BE UNDERCUT.

9. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE IN THIS REPORT THAT THE - ALLIANCE'S MOST SUCCESSFUL RECENT EFFORT IN THE FIELD OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, TOUCHING ON BOTH PRE-CSCE AND CONFIDENTIAL

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POST-CSCE DELIBERATIONS, IS THE ONE IN WHICH THE ALLIANCE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES HAVE BEEN MOST CLOSELY ASSOCIATED. I BELIEVE THAT OUR MULTI-LATERAL DIFFICULTIES MUST BE FACED SQUARELY AND THAT, IF THIS IS DONE, THEY CAN BE MASTERED. IF WE FAIL TO GRASP THIS NETTLE FIRMLY, HOWEVER, WE MAY INSTEAD FIND OURSELVES MASTERED BY THE DIFFICULTIES.

10. IN THIS REGARD, I AM ENCOURAGED BY THE EXAMPLE WHICH HAS BEEN SET BY THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION. NOT ONLY DID VICE-PRESIDENT MONDALE MEET WITH THE COUNCIL WITHIN HOURS OF TAKING OFFICE, BUT SECRETARY VANCE BRIEFED US IN DETAIL ON US OBJECTIVES PRIOR TO HIS TRIP TO MOSCOW IN MARCH. THE COUNCIL ALSO RECEIVED AN EXTENSIVE DEBRIEFING FROM SENIOR US ADVISERS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MOSCOW MEETINGS.

11. I REALIZE THAT NOT ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS ELSEWHERE WHICH WOULD BE OF BROAD INTEREST TO THE COUNCIL. A - . NUMBER OF OUR MEMBERS, HOWEVER, DO HAVE SUCH OPPORTUNITIES FREQUENTLY AND THEY PUT THEMSELVES FORWARD TOO RARELY, IF AT ALL, IN ALLIANCE DELIBERATIONS. SOME, I MUST CONCLUDE, ARE RELUCTANT TO CAST THEMSELVES IN THE LIMELIGHT IN THIS FASHION. MAY I REMIND EVERYONE, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT WE ALL AGREED TO DO IN THE OTTAWA DECLARATION, NAMELY, "TO STRENGTHEN THE PRACTICE OF FRANK AND TIMELY CONSULTATIONS".

II. EAST-WEST RELATIONS

12. THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT CEASED ITS CURRENT STRIVING TO PERFECT ITS MILITARY POSTURE AND THIS HAS HAD ITS EFFECTS ON THE LEVEL OF EAST-WEST TENSIONS. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS BEFORE THE ALLIANCE AT THIS TIME IS WHETHER A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS DOES OR DOES NOT CONFER

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UNEQUAL BENEFIT ON THE USSR AND ITS CLIENT STATES. IF THE WARSAW PACT STATES ARE REAPING A PREPONDERANT ADVANTAGE FROM THE CURRENT DETENTE ATMOSPHERE, FOR EXAMPLE IN ECONOMIC MATTERS, ALLIED LEADERS SHOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER MEASURES TO REDRESS THE BALANCE.

13. MUCH OF OUR DISCUSSION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AT THE MAY MINISTERIAL MEETING WILL INEVITABLY REVOLVE, I ASSUME, AROUND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SO-CALLED "REVIEW CONFERENCE" AT BELGRADE. AS I SAID BEFORE, THE HISTORY OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS IN PREPARATION FOR THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA IS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF HOW TO CONDUCT MEANINGFUL CONSULTATIONS. BECAUSE ALLIANCE APPROACHES WERE REASONABLE AND CONSISTENT, MOREOVER, THEY ATTRACTED THE SUPPORT OF VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE.

14. THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES WERE REQUIRED TO ACCEPT PROVISIONS IN THE FINAL ACT WHICH THEY HAD STRUGGLED MIGHTILY TO AVOID. WE HAVE ALL SEEN IN RECENT MONTHS SOME OF THE REASONS WHY THEY RESISTED MAKING THE MODEST COMMITMENTS THEY WERE FINALLY OBLIGED TO ACCEPT IN THE PRINCIPLES AND IN BASKET THREE OF THE FINAL ACT.

15. SOVIET LEADERS HAD WORKED HARD TO CONVENE THE CSCE IN THE FIRST PLACE AND CLEARLY HOPED TO USE THE SIGNING OF THE HELSINKI DOCUMENT AS A SYMBOL OF THE "LEGITIMACY" OF THEIR RULE OVER EASTERN EUROPE. THIS WAS DESIGNED TO IMPRESS ON THE PEOPLES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, THOSE IN EASTERN EUROPE THAT RESISTANCE TO COMMUNIST PARTY WAS HOPELESS. IN FACT, THE VERY OPPOSITE HAS OCCURRED. THE CLEAR ENDORSEMENT IN THE FINAL ACT OF SIMPLE HUMAN RIGHTS THAT ARE TAKEN FOR GRANTED IN THE WESTERN WORLD HAS SERVED AS A BANNER TO THE OPPRESSED

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PEOPLES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND TO THOSE HARDY FEW IN THE
SOVIET UNION ITSELF WHO DARE TO RISK THE DISPLEASURE OF
THE SOVIET APPARATUS.

16. MOREOVER, THE DRAMA OF THE CIVIL RIGHT ACTIVISTS IN
THE SOVIET SPHERE AND THE EFFORTS OF THE AUTHORITIES TO
SUPPRESS THEIR ACTIVITIES HAS ONCE AGAIN CAPTURED THE
IMAGINATION OF OUR MORE FORTUNATE PEOPLES IN THE WEST.
CONSEQUENTLY, EVEN COMMUNIST LEADERS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES
HAVE BEEN OBLIGED TO DENOUNCE THE OPPRESSIVE TACTICS OF
THEIR FELLOW PARTY MEMBERS IN EASTERN EUROPE,
IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THEIR OWN CREDIBILITY WITH WESTERN
ELECTORATES.

17. NO MEMBER COUNTRY OF THE ALLIANCE DESIRES TO CREATE A
CONFRONTATION ATMOSPHERE AT THE BELGRADE MEETINGS AND THE
GENERAL DISPOSITION WILL BE TO AVOID UNPRODUCTIVE RECRIM-
INATIONS. HOWEVER, MOST MEMBERS WILL WISH TO MAKE THEIR
OWN POSITIONS CLEAR ON ALL THE IMPORTANT ISSUES EVOKED BY
THE FINAL ACT. THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE LEFT IN NO DOUBT
THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT IN EAST-WEST
RELATIONS, JUST AS MUCH AS ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC CO-
OPERATION ARE. FURTHERMORE, IT MUST BE MADE CLEAR TO THEM
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THAT POLITICAL OR POLITICO-MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE
AND IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD ALSO HAVE AN
INEVITABLE IMPACT ON THE PROSPECTS FOR DETENTE. IN
RETURN, ONE CAN ANTICIPATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS
CLIENT STATES WILL RESPOND VIGOROUSLY, IF ONLY IN THE
GUISE OF A COUNTER-ATTACK. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE
ALLIES MUST CONCERT THEIR POSITIONS THOROUGHLY IN ADVANCE.

18. AS THE HARMEL REPORT POINTED OUT, AND THE OTTAWA

DECLARATION REAFFIRMED, CRISES AND CONFLICTS ARISING OUTSIDE THE TREATY AREA MAY IMPAIR ITS SECURITY. IN THIS CONTEXT, I MUST REPORT THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SEVERAL PARTS OF AFRICA INSPIRES IN ME THE GREATEST DISQUIET. THE ALLIES ARE COMPLETELY UNITED IN REJECTING THE EVILS STEMMING FROM RACIAL DISCRIMINATION. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE WEST IS IN DANGER OF LOSING ITS REMAINING INFLUENCE IN AFRICA DUE TO THE CYNICAL EXPLOITATION OF THE TURMOIL ON THAT CONTINENT BY THE SOVIET UNION. IT HAS OFTEN GIVEN ITS SUPPORT RECKLESSLY TO THE PURSUIT OF EXTREMIST SOLUTIONS, BASED ON THE USE OF FORCE, REJECTING ANY SOLUTIONS BASED ON COMPROMISES.

19. AT THE MOMENT, THE SITUATION IN ZAIRE APPEARS TO BE EVOLVING IN RELATIVELY SATISFACTORY FASHION. ASSISTANCE FROM INTERESTED WESTERN COUNTRIES PLAYED A MAJOR PART. THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF THE SITUATION IN THAT PART OF AFRICA AS WELL AS OTHERS, WILL REQUIRE CONTINUED ATTENTION ON THE PART OF ALLIANCE MEMBERS. CONCLUSIONS

20. DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR TWO MAJOR AREAS OF CONCERN, THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS, ARE NOT ONLY CLOSELY INTERTWINED; ONE IS A FUNCTION OF THE OTHER. THE ALLIANCE WAS ORIGINALLY CREATED BECAUSE OF A GENERAL CONVICTION THAT THE COURSE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS COULD NOT BE STABILIZED WITHOUT AN INSTITUTION CAPABLE OF ORGAN-
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IZING AND CO-ORDINATING THE INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS OF THE THREATENED NATIONS OF EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA. I SEE NO EVIDENCE ON THE HORIZON THAT WOULD LEAD US TO ALTER THAT FUNDAMENTAL JUDGMENT.

21. ACCORDINGLY, ALTHOUGH THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE HAS A VALUE IN AND OF ITSELF, ITS VALUE AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR MANAGING THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IS EVEN GREATER. FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE ALLIANCE IS TRULY GREATER THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS AND ITS SOLIDARITY MAXIMIZES THE INFLUENCE OUR INDIVIDUAL NATIONS CAN EXERT ON THE DETERMINATION OF SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT POLICIES.

22. FINALLY, I THINK IT IS CLEAR THAT OFTEN "WE HAVE LEFT UNDONE THOSE THINGS WHICH WE OUGHT TO HAVE DONE, AND WE HAVE DONE THOSE THINGS WHICH WE OUGHT NOT TO HAVE DONE". THE PAST YEAR HAS OFFERED US EXAMPLES OF BOTH, MOST CLEARLY I THINK IN THE CASE OF OUR INABILITY TO AGREE ON A SINGLE NATO AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM. THE IMPACT OF THAT FAILURE IS NOT ENTIRELY POLITICAL, OF COURSE, BECAUSE THERE WILL BE UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR MILITARY POSTURE AND OUR BUDGETARY EFFECTIVENESS. THOSE PROBLEMS, HOWEVER, SEEM MANAGEABLE.

THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW TO ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, I FEAR, MAY BE MORE LONG LASTING.

23. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BALANCE SHEET, ALLIANCE MINISTERS, WEIGHED DOWN AS THEY ARE BY THEIR GOVERNING RESPONSIBILITIES AND DIFFICULTIES, SOMETIMES FAIL TO APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTIES FACING THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN THE EAST. ALTHOUGH THE WARSAW PACT NATIONS HAVE BUILT UP THEIR STRENGTH ON THE MILITARY PLANE IN A MOST IMPRES-

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SIVE MANNER, THEIR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES ARE, IF ANYTHING, ON THE RISE. THEIR AWARENESS OF THOSE VULNERABILITIES IS, OF COURSE, AT THE ROOT OF WARSAW PACT EAGERNESS TO CONTINUE THE PRESENT COURSE OF DETENTE.

24. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE TO MAINTAIN A CAUTIOUS CAST OF MIND WHEN DEALING WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. THIS WILL REQUIRE, FIRST OF ALL, THE MAINTENANCE OF A SATISFACTORY EQUILIBRIUM OF MILITARY POWER AND, CONSEQUENTLY, SOME ADDITIONAL EFFORT ON THE PART OF ALLIANCE MEMBERS, GIVEN THE EROSION OVER THE PAST DECADE IN THE WEST'S MARGIN OF SECURITY. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE PREPARED TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL RATHER THAN A RETURN TO A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THE ALLIES MUST KEEP THIS QUESTION UNDER CONSTANT SCRUTINY. PRESIDENT

CARTER HAS MADE IT CLEAR, I AM GLAD TO SAY, THAT THE US GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO RESPOND VIGOROUSLY ALONG WHICHEVER PATH IS CHOSEN.

25. ANOTHER REQUIREMENT, NEARLY AS VITAL AS THE MILITARY COMPONENT, IS TO PRESERVE THE PRINCIPLE THAT DETENTE IS INDIVISIBLE AND THAT ITS BENEFITS MUST BE EQUALLY
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AVAILABLE TO BOTH SIDES. THIS REQUIRES THAT WE KEEP UNDER ACTIVE REVIEW THE MULTIPLICITY OF CONTACTS WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED IN RECENT YEARS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THESE SPREADING EAST-WEST CONTACTS HAVE A POTENTIAL FOR CONTRIBUTING IN A MAJOR WAY TO A MORE STABLE INTERNATIONAL ORDER. HOWEVER, IF ALLOWED TO PROLIFERATE INDISCRIMINATELY, AND THEREBY TO FACILITATE ONE-SIDED EXPLOITATION BY THE TIGHTLY CONTROLLED SOCIETIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, THEY COULD DESTROY THE BALANCE ON WHICH ANY GENUINE RELAXATION OF TENSIONS MUST BE BASED. THE FORTHCOMING MINISTERIAL MEETING PROVIDES AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE A HARD LOOK AT THE EVOLVING SITUATION AND I URGE ALL ITS PARTICIPANTS TO SEIZE THEIR OPPORTUNITY TO DO JUST THAT.END TEXT.BENNETT

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